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Testimony of Major Walt Mulder

After King-56 crashed, Major Walt Mulder, a pilot with the Portland-based 304th Rescue Squadron, told Air Force investigators about an experience that he thought might explain what happened to King-56.

Testifying under oath on March 14, 1997, Mulder described his encounter with the engine power loss problem known as "four-engine rollback." Willamette Week  has found support for Mulder's theory among engineers, aviation safety analysts and internal Air Force safety memos.

BOARD INVESTIGATION

NOVEMBER 22, 1996

C-130 CRASH

DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

MAJ WALT MULDER

DATE TAKEN:  March 14, 1997

TIME:   10:00 a.m.

PLACE:   Portland Air Base, Portland, Oregon

COURT REPORTER:  TERESA L. RIDER, RPR, CSR

RIDER & ASSOCIATES

COURT REPORTERS

P.O. Box 245

Vancouver, Washlngton  98666

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

COL LANDTROOP:  My name is Col Larry Landtroop, andI'm the investigating officer.  This is Lt Col Kuh, who is the operations advisor.  Lt Rhonda Streff, who is the LG, maintenance -- technical advisor.  Capt Mark Engleman, is who is the flight surgeon on the board.  And my legal advisor is Capt Lance Thaxton for this investigation.

We are investigating the aircraft accident that occurred on 22 November 1996, approximately 40 miles off the coast of California.  This investigation is separate and apart from the safety investigation conducted under AFI 91-204.  The purpose of this investigation is to find and preserve evidence to use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes.

A safety investigation has been conducted on the accident.  Any testimony you gave before the safety investigation board will be kept confidential and can be used only for mishap prevention purposes.  However, your testimony to us may be used for any purpose that the authorities involved decide is proper and can and will be released to the public.

Do you understand the difference between the safety investigation and this accident investigation?

THE WITNESS:  Yes.

COL LANDTROOP:  Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give in this matter now under

investigation shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

THE WITNESS:  I do.

COL LANDTROOP:  For the record please state your full name, rank, unit and position.

THE WITNESS:  Walter Henry Mulder, 304th Rescue Squadron, and I am a major.

COL LANDTROOP:  And your position in the squadron?

THE WITNESS:  I'm aircraft commander, pilot with the 304th Reserves.

COL LANDTROOP:  About how long have you been in the unit?

THE WITNESS:  Since 1993, March of '93.

COL LANDTROOP:  Were you present at the unit on the day, the evening of the accident?

THE WITNESS:  I was not at the unit, no.

COL LANDTROOP:  Have you ever in the past flown Aircraft 856.

THE WITNESS:  Yes.

COL LANDTROOP:  Have you ever experienced any problems with 856 that might be related to this accident?

THE WITNESS:  Nothing that I could recall, not knowing what the accident entails.

COL LANDTROOP:  Have you ever experienced anything with 856 that was out of the ordinary?

THE WITNESS:  Probably some minor maintenance write-ups.  I don't recall any particular write-ups.

COL LANDTROOP:  Are you a full-time Air Reserve Technician or just a traditional Reservist?

THE WITNESS:  Right now a traditional Reservist.

COL LANDTROOP:  Col Kuh, do you have any questions?

LT COL KUH:  One.  Your duty status at the time of the accident or mishap?

THE WITNESS:  At that time I was in civilian status working with Horizon.  And I was at Medford when I found out about the accident.

LT COL KUH:  Okay.  Do you have any information or knowledge that you would feel would be pertinent to this investigation?

THE WITNESS:  Without having any kind of knowledge ofwhat might have gone wrong yet, I haven't seen the accident report, I don't have any input, because it would be pure speculation.

(Pause in proceedings)

COL LANDTROOP:  In your position as a pilot and aircraft commander, have you ever experienced an emergency or a situation where you had to shut an engine down?

THE WITNESS:  Yes.

COL LANDTROOP:  Do you remember what might have caused or what the cause was that you had to shut that engine down?

THE WITNESS:  In the situation where I've had -- where we shut an engine down, that was a simple indication problem with the oil pressure, and that was just a sinqle engine shutdown, one engine was shut down, the plane was returned normally, to landing.

COL LANDTROOP:  In your flying experience on a 130, have you ever experienced an either simultaneous or individual power loss on any of the engines?

THE WITNESS:  Yes.

COL LANDTROOP:  Was that -- do you remember if that was on

Aircraft 856.

THE WITNESS:  No, it was not.

COL LANDTROOP:  But it was on a comparable model, HC-130, P model aircraft.

THE WITNESS:  Yes.

COL LANDTROOP:  Could you tell me a little bit about what you experienced on that aircraft and what the indications were?

THE WITNESS:  On that aircraft we experienced what appearred to be indications of a possible flame-out on No. 2 engine.  And the procedure there would have been to shut it down.  At about the time we were going to shut it down, the engineer stopped --

COL LANDTROOP:  You said a possible, it looked like a flame-out, TIT fuel flow fluctuating or going toward the --

THE WITNESS:  Going, actually low.  Rpm was still up there, but the torque, we had probably about three or 4,000 inch pounds of torque.

COL LANDTROOP:  Total or loss?

THE WITNESS:  No, total on that engine.  And TIT was lower than normal.  I can't recall the exact numbers.  Rpm was still up at that time.  And fuel flow was -- I can't remember what the fuel flow was.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  For the non-flyers who are going to be reading this, you had a combination of gauge indications that suggested to you you might have a flame-out on Engine 2?

THE WITNESS:  You would have indications that would suggest you should shut that engine down, under normal shutdown procedures, emergency shutdown procedures.

COL LANDTROOP:  Did you shut that engine down?

THE WITNESS:  No, we didn't.  We were about to shut it down and the engineer stopped us because he saw something else, and that something else was the other engines were starting to fluctuate as well, 3, 4 and No. 1.  At that time the other engines also started losing power and rolling back.  And at that time he declared it looked like a four-engine rollback, at which time we executed the procedures for a 4 engine rollback.

COL LANDTROOP:  Did that correct the situation?

THE WITNESS:  The last step, which is pulling the circuit breakers for the syncrophasers, did correct that situation.  The engines had all rolled back to approximately 2 to 3 inch pounds, plus or minus a thousand on each enqine, insufficient to maintain level of flight.  And when --

COL LANDTROOP:  Was that a rollback of 2 to 3,000 pounds or a total torque of --

THE WITNESS:  2 to 3,000 inch pounds on each engine, not --

COL LANDTROOP:  Not a loss of 2 to 3, but that was the total, what the gauges were reading.

THE WITNESS:  Right.  So that would have been approximately 8 to 10,000 pounds of torque across the board, which is still insufficient to maintain a level of flight.  And upon pulling the circuit breakers, the engines started returning slowly back, one at a time, to normal operating parameters.

LT COL KUH:  Not simultaneously, but individually?

THE WITNESS:  Individually.  A couple of them -- well, I don't say simultaneously.  When the circuit breakers were pulled, they didn't all just immediately come back right up, but they did slowly start at different rates to come back up to normal parameters.

COL LANDTROOP:  When you returned and landed, what actions did maintenance take?

THE WITNESS:  Maintenance, as I recall, changed out the syncrophasers, and as I -- I don't recall whether they were tube type or solid-state syncrophasers at the time.

LT ENGLEMAN:  Do you recall if maintenance said there was a problem with the syncrophaser or because of the circumstances that pulling the breaker on the syncrophaser corrected the problem?  Did they actually find a problem with the syncrophaser?

THE WITNESS:  Not that I recall.   All I know is they changed out the syncrophasers.  They did a full engine run on it.  They couldn't find any indications, which I wouldn't expect them to, and we ended up taking off again the same day.

CAPT THAXTON:  Who was the engineer on that flight?

THE WITNESS: I don't have it written in my records.  I know the guy's face, sort of a Polish last name.

COL LANDTROOP:  Was it the same engineer that was on the accident aircraft?

THE WITNESS:  No, it was not.  This was on active duty in '92.

LT COL KUH:  If I gave the names of engineers, would you recognize --

CAPT THAXTON:  Where was this at?

THE WITNESS:  This was coming off of Land's End, tip of Land's End in United Kingdom, proceeding towards Bermuda.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  What base were you assigned to?

THE WITNESS:  Took off out of Alconbury.  I was just coming up over the coast.

LT COL KUH:  Do you remember your altitude that that occurred?

THE WITNESS:  I believe we were at 18,000 feet, right about that altitude, and when it was all recovered we were approximately 14,000 feet.  We lost about 4,000 feet.

LT COL KUH:  When the first engine problem developed were you on a climb?  Level flight?

THE WITNESS:  We were in level flight with the autopilot on.

LT COL KUH:  Set with cruise airspeed?

THE WITNESS:  Right.  Heavy weight, that would be about normal for that gross weight of the aircraft.

LT COL KUH:  Do you remember the atmosphere conditions at the time?

sunny day.

THE WITNESS:  It was a clear day, it was fall.

LT COL KUH:  Clouds?   

THE WITNESS:  No, we were in the clear.  It was a sunny day.

COL LANDTROOP:  Did the rpm fluctuate at all?

THE WITNESS:  Yes.   

COL LANDTROOP:  Did it just fluctuate or did it drop off, as well?

THE WITNESS:  As I recall it was dropping.   

COL LANDTROOP:  In your experience in flying with different crews, would you say that it was or was not a general conception that it was possible to have a four-engine rollback on one or two enqines, verses all four at the same time?

THE WITNESS:  Yes, in looking at briefings I've had in the past and talking to other pilots, it's my understanding that no four-enqine rollback is the same.  Some may involve just a slight loss of power across the board on each engine.

There was one that my unit had in Turkey that happened at a low level and it was two out of the four engines that rolled back.

COL LANDTROOP:  But the general pilot population, if you asked them if it was possible to have one or two or four,which way would you -- if you said you had a power loss rollback, would they think it was all four?

THE WITNESS:  I would think so.  I can't speak for other people.

CAPT THAXTON:  That's something we need to clarify.

COL LANDTROOP:  This is your opinion?

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Can you ask him if he --

THE WITNESS:  What I think.

LT COL KUH:  The incident in Turkey that you have knowledge of or secondhand knowledge, do you remember which engines experienced the problem?

THE WITNESS:  No.

LT STREFF:  Did you have any other maintenance or problems concurrent with the engines, electrical?

THE WITNESS:  Not with that, other than some generators.  If the rpm drops below a certain frequency, you can have generators drop off line.

LT COL KUH:  In the incident that you described you went through the four-engine rollback procedures, would you have any reason to believe there was another cause for the rollback other than what you think may have occurred?

THE WITNESS:  The cause, I suspect, just goes to both previous incidences and to reading in FCIF which had come out at the time.  There was suspect that four-engine rollbacks were caused by a voltage spike on the essential AC bus, related to the syncrophasers.  And there was also a FICF that came out which gave certain range of high frequency radio frequencies that might cause a high voltage output.

CAPT THAXTON:  These are all assumptions you're making, not --

THE WITNESS:  Well, the FCIF was in writing, that there was a frequency range that might cause a possible  four-engine rollback, but Boeing had never come out with anything that said this could cause it.

CAPT THAXTON:  Turn off the tape real quick.

(Pause in proceedings.)

THE WITNESS:  One thing I do need to correct, before I mentioned Boeing, and C-130's are obvlously Lockheed.  I'm thinking of Boeing because of the other aircraft I deal with in my civilian job.  But Lockheed was the aircraft there.

LT COL KUH:  The mishap that you describe that occurred to you where it involved more than one engine, do you remember the date or approximately when this occurred?

THE WITNESS:  I have it.  I gave it to the accident board.  It's in my logbook.

CAPT THAXTON:  You don't need to tell us that stuff.  You have a copy of it somewhere?

THE WITNESS:  Yes, I believe it was the 29th of October '92.

CAPT THAXTON:  We could get a copy from you, is that correct?

THE WITNESS:  Sure, I can make a copy of my logbook to that day.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  He's pointing out you shouldn't tell us what you did or did not tell the safety board, period.

THE WITNESS:  Okay.

LT COL KUH:  We're not privy to that.

THE WITNESS:  Good.

LT COL KUH:  Do you remember approximately or the date when you read that FCIF?

THE WITNESS:  The FCIF was probably read a month or two prior.  It did come out the same year, as I recall.  And it should have been distributed Air Force wide for C-130 units.

LT COL KUH:  I have no further questions at this time.

LT STREFF:  I have no further questions.

LT ENGLEMAN:  I have no questions.

CAPT THAXTON:  No questions.  Thank you.

COL LANDTROOP:  I 'd just like to remind you not to discuss this investigation or your testimony with anyone, including affected commanders, until this report is approved by the convening authority.

THE WITNESS:  Okay.

(Interview concluded.)