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Testimony of Tsgt Robert Vogel

Sgt. Bobby Vogel says he has recurring nightmares about being "eaten by fish." It's no wonder. After King-56 crashed into the Pacific Ocean, 40 miles from the coast, Vogel spent almost three hours floating in shark-infested waters before he was rescued by the Coast Guard. The harrowing details of King-56's final flight and Vogel's survival ordeal are included in his testimony to the Air Force Accident Board below.

BOARD INVESTIGATION of NOVEMBER 22, 1996 C-130 CRASH

TESTIMONY UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF Tsgt ROBERT T. VOGEL

DATE TAKEN: March 7, 1997

TIME: 5:00 p.m.

PLACE: Portland Air Base, Portland, Oregon

COURT REPORTER: MICHAEL R. KING, CSR

RIDER & ASSOCIATES

Court Reporters

P.O. Box 245

Vancouver, Washington 98666

APPEARANCES

BOARD MEMBERS:

Col Larry Landtroop

Lt Col Greg Kuh

Capt Lance Thaxton

Capt Mark Engleman

Lt Rhonda Streff

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay. What I am going to do is my name is Colonel Larry Landtroop. I am the investigating officer. This is Lt Colonel Greg Kuh, Captain Mark Engleman, Lt Rhonda Streff, who are the technical advisors on the board, and Captain Lance Thaxton, who is the legal member of the board for this investigation. And we are investigating the aircraft accident that occurred on the 22nd of November '96, approximately 40 miles off the coast of California.

This investigation is separate and apart from the Safety Investigation conducted under the AFI 91-204. The purpose of this investigation is to find and preserve the evidence to use in claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, adverse administration proceedings and for all other purposes.

A separate investigation has been conducted on the accident. Any testimony you gave before the Safety Investigation Board will be kept confidential and be used only for mishap prevention purposes.  However, your testimony to us may be used for any purpose that the authorities involved decide is proper and can be released to the public.

Do you understand the difference between the Safety and this accident investigation?

THE WITNESS:  Uh-huh.

COL LANDTROOP:  If you will stand up and raise your right hand.

Tsgt ROBERT T. VOGEL, called as a witness by the Board, having been duly sworn,

was examined and testified as follows:

EXMINATION

COL LANDTROOP:  We've kind of gone through and put together some questions.  What we want to do is to get your ideas of when it first started, through the end, and we're going to go back a little bit to when you first showed up for duty that day.  And we'll start and ask some questions and then I'm going to let you kind of relate your feelings of what took place, your ideas before the impact and then when you were recovered.

CAPT THAXTON:  Before we do that, I need you to state your full name and your unit.

THE WITNESS: Okay.  My name is Robert T. Vogel.  I'm a Tech Sergeant. I am with the 304th Rescue Squadron.

CAPT THAXTON:  Okay.

COL LANDTROOP:  Just we'll start off, do you recall what time you reported for duty that day?

THE WITNESS:  Sometime after the briefing, because I am a student. I was taking a test or something that day, so I showed up after the briefing. Checked in with the pilot, checked my FCIFs file for the -- I am assuming that it was about 4:30 or so.

COL LANDTROOP:  Do you remember what time the briefing was scheduled for?

THE WITNESS:  It was probably 3:00.

COL LANDTROOP:  And you wouldn't, then, recall when the other crew members reported because they were there when you got there?

THE WITNESS:  Right.

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.  And you wouldn't be able to talk about the crew briefing, since you got there afterwards?

CAPT THAXTON:  Do you happen to know who was at the briefing?

THE WITNESS: No, I do.  I informed them of that, I think, the day prior and again that day that I was going to be late because I -- I was going to go -- I had to be in class and I wasn't going to miss class and I would be late at the briefing and wanted a pilot briefing one-on-one on what to expect.

COL LANDTROOP:  How about when you got there, how about just telling us a little bit about what you did, your actions there at the unit before you went out to the airplane.

THE WITNESS:  Okay. That's all on this tape, if you would like to listen to the tape, that's all on here.  And like I said, it's been three months since I have been there and I haven't listened to the tape. I'm sure it's all on here because I went step by step by step the process of when I showed up to the aircraft.

CAPT THAXTON:  Yeah, that's fine. We can listen to the tape.

THE WITNESS:  That would help me jog my memory, too.

COL LANDTROOP:  One of the things is that when we do listen to the tape, that will become a part of the factual evidence, if you will.

THE WITNESS:  That's fine.  As I said, I am going to keep this.

COL LANDTROOP:  All right.

THE WITNESS:  This is mine. We can make a copy of it or we can listen to it.

CAPT THAXTON:  We will listen to it and it'll be recorded on the tape.

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.

THE WITNESS:  I think this is the mike here.

COL LANDTROOP:  That is correct. You can just set it down here and it'11 pick it up.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

(Discussion off the record.)

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.  Back to what we were talking about, the time period from when you get there to when you went outside, just your normal routine.

THE WITNESS:  Well, like I said, I showed up late for the briefing, so I grabbed ahold of the aircraft commander, Bob Schott, and asked him to explain if there has been any changes.  Originally, the flight was scheduled to be over land down to San Diego, so I wasn't going to need any classified information. 

So I talked to Bob Schott and I said, "Hey, you know, I am here. What did I miss in the briefing?"

He briefed me one-on-one.  He told me we were flying over the water, a navigable water mission, and that I would need the classified information, the kits, the keys for IFF, the authentication devices, just in case we got picked up by Big Foot.

So I went in -- I went into the Com Sec room, got the classified information in my bag, stuck it in there. I talked to Brant for a few minutes just to catch up on the regular B.S., to see what was going on.

And I went out to the lobby to check my FCIFs and the Squadron Reads file.  I penciled the changes in, whatever changes at the time. I read through there, signed it off.

I had Bob Schott and Brant come out to my car and I got my flying gear, and then they helped me carry my stuff out to the aircraft.

Once I got -- You want me to continue?

COL LANDTROOP:  Yeah.

THE WITNESS:  Once I got to the aircraft, I did a quick walkaround to make sure everything was there.  I checked the forms.  I had flown the aircraft the night prior to that for a five-hour mission over water.

And then I had -- I believe I had two radio write-ups; I'm not sure.  One was a maritime radio, and then the other one -- I can't remember what the other write-up was. But I wrote those up to see that those were fixed.

COL LANDTROOP:  Was this the same aircraft the night before?

THE WITNESS:  Exact same aircraft.

COL LANDTROOP:  King 56?

THE WITNESS:  Right.  Yes.

CAPT THAXTON:  What were the write-ups for, the radio?

THE WITNESS:  Again, that's on the tape here.  I believe it was the 513; that's maritime radio that you talk to the ships and so forth.  I believe the

other one was the HF -- um -- 2 was written up for something.  I don't remember what the actual write-ups were on that, but I know they weren't working as they were advertised, so write 'em up.

COL LANDTROOP:  That was the night before?

THE WITNESS:  Right, Thursday night.

COL LANDTROOP:  When you went out that night, the night of the accident, do you remember any maintenance write-ups that were on the aircraft that were open or that you might have experienced anything prior to engines started, taxiing out? Any minor thing, I mean, you know?

THE WITNESS:  No. What I usually -- when I check the forms on a regular basis, I check for red Xs to see if anything is open.

COL LANDTROOP:  Right.

THE WITNESS:  I check for any write-ups that are going to affect my duties on the aircraft.  So that's communication gear; it deals with the navigational-type stuff.  Anything that deals with me specifically, do I look for. And if there is an open write-up, I will look at it just to see what it is to see how it's going to affect my duties on that mission.

COL LANDTROOP:  Do you remember any write-ups, any open diagonals or anything?

THE WITNESS:  Not off the top of my head, no, I don't.

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.  The takeoff, everything went, I guess, pretty normal all the way up to level off?  Standard mission like you fly all the time?

THE WITNESS:  Right.  Our takeoff was delayed for a few minutes on the ground and that was due to the -- I can't remember what it's called.  When you got to have your over-water clearance separation.  I'm not sure what it's called.  But they were holding us on the ground for a few minutes so we could catch our window.

COL LANDTROOP:  Right. Oceanic clearance.

THE WITNESS: Oceanic clearance, that's what it's called.  I haven't flown in three months, so I am a little rusty there.

COL LANDTROOP:  That's fine.

THE WITNESS:  So we were waiting for our oceanic clearance.  We taxied to the far side.  It takes about five minutes to get over there.  We sat and waited for our clearance.  Once we got our clearance, we climbed up to -- I think it was 16,000 -- yeah, probably 16,000.  And then once we got over -- probably about 20 minutes after takeoff, headed towards -- Newport was our first point.  We got clearance up to 22, and started our climb, our slow, lumbering climb up to 22.

And then our next point was, I believe, Hemlo, our standard navigational point.  We hit Hemlo and we turned the aircraft south to our next point.  I made a few radio calls to pass our -- what was it to? It was a civilian airport.  I called 2554.

COL LANDTROOP:  One of the flight services?

THE WITNESS:  Right.  Called down there to San Diego and let 'em know we took off, just give everybody a picture of when we should get down there.

COL LANDTROOP:  So everything was -- everything was, you would say, pretty standard and normal up to flight level 220 where you leveled off?

THE WITNESS:  Yeah, everything.  Nothing out of the ordinary, a typical flight.

COL LANDTROOP:  Do you remember what the weather was like departing out of here and then at the flight level?

THE WITNESS:  It was partly -- I believe it was partly cloudy.  Well, it's partly cloudy here all the time.  But it wasn't raining; it wasn't raining outside.  I remember that.  I was kind of amazed it wasn't raining.  It was partly cloudy.

COL LANDTROOP:  Do you know if it was clear up at flight level?

THE WITNESS:  We were kind of in and out of clouds.  It started to get dark about that time, so it was getting dark outside.  We were in and out of the clouds.  When we qot to 22 and headed south, it was pretty clear outside. Clouds weren't up that high.

COL LANDTROOP:  So up at flight level, then, it was clear?

THE WITNESS:  Right.

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.  Then it was just -- if you would just kind of start from your flight level 220, everything was normal and then things started to happen.  Just kind of go through, if you would, just take your time and just relay to us basically the sequence of events that took place.

THE WITNESS:  Okay.  It was probably an hour and a half after we took off.  I had just got done -- I had just completed a radio call to Hawaii to get ahold of the Navy guys down in San Diego and let them know that -- just I got ahold of the Navigator Kirk, and I told Kirk, I said, "Give me a window of when we're going to be on the ground in San Diego." And he gave me a plus or minus 10- to 15-minute guess.  So I called Hickam Global and passed off our landing time and this is what we're going to need when we land.

Maybe two or three minutes after that -- I guess, maybe 10 minutes after that, I was just -- I was just -- it was just a typical flight, auto pilot was on.  I hadn't flown with the crew for a while, so I was just B.S.-ing with them, catching up on the gossip, who is -- what everybody is doing in life.

Bob Bob was sitting back, reading a book.  And he -- Bob Bob is the engineer -- was sitting back, reading a book and I am sitting in my position.  Kirk was at his.  Bob Schott was the co-pilot.  He opted to let Brant be the aircraft commander on the way down.

Bob Bob was kicked back in his cushy flight engineer seat, and he was reading a book and he was scanning the engines at the moment.  He just reached up and this is what he said.  He said, "What the fuck is going on with No. 3?  We're losing torque on No. 3."

And all of the missions I have flown, that's never happened to me, so immediately I got curious.  So I stand up and scan -- I'm not sure what I am looking for.   So I look up and Brant and Bob start the troubleshooting process at this time.

Bob said something about -- Bob Schott -- there is three Bobs on the airplane.  So Bob Schott said --

COL LANDTROOP:  Are you sure about that engine?  Which one --

THE WITNESS:  The torque indication on -- he said, "What the fuck is going on with No. 3?"  That was his exact words.  I'm pretty sure that were his exact words because it was torque indication on No. 3.

Should I check wlth the voice recorder?

COL LANDTROOP:  I was thinking it was No. 1.  I think that was the first engine -- that was the first one to give -- that you had a problem on.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Would you have known if they were initially having trouble with, say, engine 1, but it wasn't really a big deal?

THE WITNESS:  Yes, I would have because there was nothing going on, the auto pilot was on, everybody was -- like I said, Bob Schott was eating a sandwich.  Brant was drinking a cup of tea.  Kirk, the navigator, was doing whatever navigators do.  They're always diddling with the numbers or doing something.  And then the enlisted guys were working hard.  You know, I was -- I had my school books out, studying.  And then Bob was reading a book.

He said, "What's going on with No. 3?"  And then the next thing I heard out of Bob Schott was ''We need to shut No. 3 down."

And then I -- the course of events here are going to be, I would say, between two and three minutes tops, somewhere in between there as the window.  It couldn't have been more than three minutes from the time we lost the first engine to the time we lost the last one.

Bob made a call to Oakland Center, declared an in-flight emergency.  I thought that was pretty quick on his part.  He declared an in-flight emergency.

I tried -- I started to get a little nervous because I had been in a lot of situations, but nothing like this, so my situational awareness wasn't what it should have been.  Usually I follow on a map and mark where I am at on the map.  Because this was such a routine mission, I was just -- maybe complacence is a good word for that.

I made a general call on 3818 on Uniform No. 1 to find out where the nearest Coast Guard station was at.  Humboldt Bay came up.  And it was a girl down there came up on the radio.  And I told her --

There was a lot of communication going on in the cockpit.  I am picking up bits and pieces.  I am trying to do my job, trying to see what everybody else was doing.

I hear -- the pilot is Bob.  I think it was Bob Schott told Brant, "Let's turn this bird in towards the coast."  And at that time, we were at flight level 220, starting to make the turn.  And I think at this time we were 60 miles or 80 miles out from the coast.  I think someone said we were 80 miles out from the coast.

They came up with a plan, just popped up out of the blue.  I think they declared our -- we were going to -- I told the Coast Guard that our intentions were going to K-Falls, Klamath Falls, in southern Oregon, that was our intentions.  I advised the Coast Guard "This is our problem, this is what we're going to do, this is where we're at, this is how many people we got on board."

COL LANDTROOP: Do you remember what radio that was on?

THE WITNESS:  Uniform No. 1.

I always take -- I set my position up exactly the same way every time.  You know, flashlight goes here, the checklist goes here, note pad goes here, radio is set up the same way.

I told 'em this is our intention. I said, "Listen for our call sign. We got some problems out here."

And then the sequence of events is very fuzzy.  We started losing all of the engines.  The engines started dropping off line.  And I remember standing up behind Brant.  By this time it's pitch black outside; there is no lights outside the aircraft at all.  I am standing up.  I look over at the navigator's position.  All the lights go off.  The skins panel comes up with testing.  And at this time, I know -- I said, "We're fucked.  The airplane's going to crash."

Brant takes off his headset.  It gets really quiet outside.  If anybody has been on a 130 -- I mean, you have all been on 130s before, I take it. Well, the I30 is a very, very noisy airplane.

He ripped off -- Brant ripped off his headset.  He goes, "Get a fucking flashlight up here now."  The cockpit is completely dark.  There is a few, maybe, lights up on above the engineer's position on the right.

I stumbled back to my position.  And I know I set my position up the same way.  I reached down, grabbed my flashlight, turned it on, walked up.  The first thing I shined it on was the altimeter.

And Brant had nosed the airplane over at this time and I saw the altimeter winding down.  And then there was a flurry of activity.  There was no interphone at this time.  Bob Bob was still in -- his hands were

moving around, throwing switches because he had a little lip mike on his mike.  He gets battery power.  Somebody says, "We have interphone."  Everybody puts their headsets back on.

The crew is -- everybody is scared at this time.  Nobody knows what to do.  Brant takes charge.  You know, he just assumes charge because he is the aircraft commander.  Everybody saw that Brant was scared and he was doing his job, so everybody else started doing their job.  So at this point, we don't have any engines.

COL LANDTROOP:  You don't have -- there were no engines running?

THE WITNESS:  Nothing.  There is no lights inside the cockpit.  We just had the interphone going.  Just interphone had -- I think -- I'm not sure how the panel is laid out, but I think he had throwed it to the batteries and that supplies power to the interphones.

COL LANDTROOP:  Now, you say they shut down No. 1 engine?

THE WITNESS:  They shut down the one engine; they shut it down.

COL LANDTROOP:  And then did they shut down the others or did they just--THE WITNESS: This is where I am having problems because at this time, I -- I went into my duties.  I made the radio call that let them know where we were at.  I let them know where we were at.  And during this time frame, maybe -- I was on the radio maybe less than a minute with the girl at Humboldt Bay.  And then, like I said, when I got done with my radio call, I felt it was a good thing that somebody knows where we're at.  And the Coast Guard's got helicopters, so if we did ditch, we would get rescued.

So then I stood up just to see what was going on, curiosity, and I was looking at the navigator's panel.

COL LANDTROOP:  That's when the lights went off?

THE WITNESS:  The lights went off and then it got really quiet.  But they had shut down No. 1; No. 1 was shut down.  And that's when Bob Schott made the decision to turn the aircraft towards the shore.  And then he also made a call to Oakland Center saying, "We're declaring an in-flight emergency."

I think Oakland Center, that is on tape.

And we made a conscious decision to turn it and divert to our alternate.

COL LANDTROOP:  When you stood up and were looking over just about the time that the lights went out, do you remember if they were moving any of the levers or what they were doing when the lights went out?

THE WITNESS:  They -- I kept hearing "Let's get the checklist out.  Let's get the checklist out."  And this is where I am -- I should be better as a crewman, you know, to know what's going on with the engines and so forth like that, but I never made a conscious decision to learn the engineer's position or the pilot's position.  I never thought I would have a need for it.

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.

THE WITNESS: I remember them getting the checklist out.  And I remember through -- it was probably 10 or 15 -- we had -- I'm not sure -- I'm not sure what the glide ratio is of the 130.  We had plenty of time to restart all the engines, plenty of time.  If I remember, there was just a general lack of confusion from the pilots and engineers saying, "How come this is not working?  This iswhat we're trained to do.  This is not working. What are we forgetting?"

And they said, "Let's try it again. Let's try it again."

COL LANDTROOP:  So they were trying to restart the engines?

THE WITNESS:  Restart engines.  And they tried over and over.  They went from one engine to the next engine to the next engine.  They tried to get the ATM -- is that what it's called? -- ATM, tried to get that running.  But it didn't want to work, didn't work.  Just everything that we tried to do didn't work.

And this is what I am getting from my position because after we lost all of the engines, I got the flashlight.  John Keyes, also being curious, came up on the flight deck to see what was going on. I told -- I told John Keyes, I said, "Here, take my flashlight.  Do what the pilot tells you." I said, "I am going to make some Mayday calls."

And so at that time, I went and got the emergency exit lights from the overhead escape hatch.  I got that one, turned it on, gave that to John Keyes. I said, "Give me my flashlight back."

I went back between the engineer's legs and grabbed down, flipped Uniform No. 1 on to -- "I want the guard; I want the main guard." I was transmitting on 243.

I transmitted a Mayday -- every 30 seconds, I went out with a Mayday call.  And it was just a general format was "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday.  This is King 56. We're in an Air Force C-130.  We've lost all four engines.  If you hear my station, please contact the Coast Guard station at Humboldt Bay," you know, "and have somebody get airborne."

COL LANDTROOP: Did you feel like it was transmitting, it was on, or was it --

THE WITNESS:  Okay.  That's a very good point.  I wasn't sure if I was going out, so what I did at that -- I made about five or six Mayday calls.  I wasn't sure if I was going out.  So I went to where we keep our survival radio, I reached and grabbed that one.  I turned it on, transmitted on that one.  I was receiving it over the aircraft receiver, so I could hear it myself.  And then I did the same for the aircraft and I received it on the PRC 90, so I knew the radio was working.  It has more power than the PRC 90, so I was using that.

COL LANDTROOP:  So you did receive on the --

THE WITNESS:  Right.

COL LANDTROOP: -- PRC 90?  You heard yourself transmit?

THE WITNESS:  Right.  I did both.  I did both ways.

COL LANDTROOP:  So the No. 1 Uniform was working like it was supposed to coming off the batteries?

THE WITNESS:  Exactly.

And one of the problems I would like to mention about the control head on the UHF radio is with battery power applied, the lights are very, very, very dim.  That needs to be changed.  And it was dark and I could still barely see it.  So if I was -- if I didn't know what I was doing, I could have rolled an improper frequency because it was very hard to read those digital displays on the UHF radio.

COL LANDTROOP:  While you were making Mayday calls, what was -- they were still trying to start the engines?

THE WITNESS:  Right.  They went from one engine to the next engine to the next engine, trying to start 'em. And I could still hear Bob Schott saying, "How come it is not fucking workinq?  What are we forgetting to do?"

And then Bob Bob replied, "We're not forgetting anything.  This is not working."  And they tried numerous times, numerous times.

Somewhere when we were coming through flight level 18,000 or so, Brant ordered the crew to put the anti-exposure suits on.

I said -- I went to climb down my cord. I am able to climb downstairs, so I climbed downstairs and grabbed five suits, brought 'em on the flight deck.  The pilot and the engineer were still troubleshooting the aircraft.  Brant told Bob Schott to get out of his seat and put his suit on.

This is just like Air Force survival training, if you ever -- I am sure you have been there and you have been there.  They put you in that dunk tank, the lights are out.  It's just like survival training, so no lights at all.

I put the suit on, burped it.  The guys -- the loadmaster's in the back briefing the passengers because they're scared shitless.  They don't know what's going on.

Bob Schott gets his on.  Brant, he gets back in -- I'm not sure if Brant or Bob Schott or Bob Bob was the next one to get out and put their suit on, but everybody on the crew had their suits on.

COL LANDTROOP:  And you do have intercom now?

THE WITNESS:  Yes, we do have intercom.

COL LANDTROOP:  You have got the batteries selected and everybody has got their headsets back on?

THE WITNESS:  Right.

COL LANDTROOP:  So you are able to communicate?

THE WITNESS:  We were able to communicate.

It took probably a couple of minutes for everybody to get their exposure suits on, again, everybody strapped in their seats again.  The -- I think we were coming through about eight or 9,000 feet.  The pilot makes a conscious decision to ditch the aircraft.

COL LANDTROOP:  Was there any discussion on the headset about the possibility of using the parachutes and bailing out?

THE WITNESS:  No.  I don't think -- during the day over the land, that would have been an option.  At night over the Pacific in the winter, nobody knows where we're at, I don't think that would have been a good decision. We would have been all separated at night.  I don't think that would have been -- to me, I thought about it, but I said, "I'm not leaving the airplane."

COL LANDTROOP:  But it never really was discussed?

THE WITNESS:  No.  We didn't have the seat packs.  We didn't have any -- we didn't have any seat packs.  We had no flotation devices except for the LPUs.  That would have been a bad decision.  And from what my understanding of the 130 is that there has been a couple of successful ditchings of the aircraft.  So again, general lack of confusion, troubleshooting.  The engineers and the pilot work as a team, all three of them, trying to keep the airplane up in the air.  They -- I wish you could hear it on tape.

But unfortunately, I checked the wiring schematics and they don't have power after you lose the engines. So that's another thing that I would like to bring up later; that I would like to see a design change.  I think I can rewire the airplane.

But just a general lack of confusion as to why the airplane is not working as advertised; why what we were taught to do didn't work.

So like I said, we were coming between six and 9,000 feet; we were descending.  They made a conscious decision to ditch the aircraft.

CAPT THAXTON:  Did you say between six and nine?

THE WITNESS:  I think seven -- seven sounds familiar, so, I mean, push it up maybe 9,000 -- seven to 9,000 feet.

Like I said, it's been three months. I haven't talked to anybody about anything since then, so it's a little bit fuzzy right now.

CAPT THAXTON:  What was the weather like?

THE WITNESS:  We couldn't see the water.  I think that was probably one of the reasons why the airplane -- I think we had a nose-down attitude because we literally could not see outside the aircraft.

Once we came -- I looked out the window.  I couldn't see the stars.  I couldn't see the ground.  I was like, "Well, I am glad I am not the pilot because I wouldn't know what the hell to do."

COL LANDTROOP:  So everybody has got their suits on and back in their seats and strapped in?

THE WITNESS:  Right.  Everybody had their suits and their LPUs on except for me.  I was the only one that didn't have my LPU on.  I thought that we had more time.  I had thought that we had more time to get my LPUs on. But we came through 3,000 feet.  I was surprised that we had went from seven to 3,000 feet like that (snap).

The pilot said, "Everybody make sure everybody is strapped in.  Check in.  We're going to ditch."  And I was, like, "Oh, I am screwed because I don't have my LPUs on."

I figure the airplane's going to just get beat up when it crashes into the water and then everybody just climb out, get into the life rafts and call for help; somebody come and get us.

COL LANDTROOP:  From where you sit in the airplane, can you just look out, look and see out the cockpit?

THE WITNESS:  Right.  I could.

COL LANDTROOP:  And generally, did you ever see the water before you impacted?

THE WITNESS:  I talked to the Coast Guard afterwards and they said there was a heavy cloud deck at about 800 feet, but I never saw the water.  I never -- the pilot was at 3,000 feet.  He said "Everybody get ready, everybody check in.  We're going to ditch."  So I took my glasses off.  I cinched down my seat belt as tight as it would get.

But before I -- sorry.  I am regressing.  Before I did that, I had that radio.  Another problem with the anti-exposure suit is there is no place to put a radio in that thing.  So I took -- I unzipped my zipper and stuck that radio down here (indicating).

CAPT THAXTON:  "Down here" as in where is down here?

THE WITNESS:  In my pelvis -- my pelvic region.

Gosh darn, you got to have a video.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Did you put it down the leg right square?

THE WITNESS:  No.  I took the radio and I stuffed it right here by my crotch. Sorry, I don't know if that works out for you.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  So left leg, medial thigh?

THE WITNESS:  Yes .  And that's what broke my pelvis; my pelvis was broke.  The radio had went into my leg on impact and I got a nice scar on my leg. But I took that radio and I stuffed it in my pants because there was not -- I tried to take a flashlight -- I tried to lift up the anti-exposure suit to get a flashlight in there, but I couldn't lift if up to get my Mag light in there so I was, like, "This really sucks."  So I just didn't -- nowhere to put anything on these suits. 

But I -- I remember John Keyes looking up the ladder going "Where is the radio? Where is the radio?"  So I grabbed him; I screamed in his ear.  I said, "Get ahold of the loadmaster just in case I don't make it.  There is a second radio back there and make sure you get it and stick it in your pants."  And so John Keyes had the second radio. Then I strapped myself in and cinched it down as tight as it would go.

Okay.  Again, like I said, I cinched my seat belt as tight as -- again, I am regressing.  I am sorry.

COL LANDTROOP:  No.  That's fine.

THE WITNESS:  Again, I guess we were about 7,000 feet.  Brant ordered -- when he made the decision to ditch, he had the loadmaster pull the rear escape hatch out and the center overhead escape hatch out, to make sure they were pulled, so they were pulled. You could hear air rushing by back there. And then so those were out before we ditched.

At 3,000 feet, he ordered everybody to check in, to make sure we were ready for a crash landing.  He told me at that time to stop transmitting Mayday calls.  From 21,000 down to 3,000 feet or so, I transmitted the Mayday calls about every 30 seconds, you know.  But I was very disappointed that nobody picked up our -- the one time I actually had to make a call for help and nobody answered me.

So from 3,000 feet on down to impact, it was quick.  The altimeter was set at 2992.  Sea state was roughly 10-foot swells.  Go through a cloud deck at 800 feet, a bad situation.  You couldn't see the water.

COL LANDTROOP: Do you have any idea what your rate of descent was at that time or the air speed? I know that's a difficult question.

THE WITNESS: I know it's going to be over 120 knots.  I know our stall was -- stall speed's, like,105 or 110 or something like that, so I know we were going with a constant slow descent.

Brant made the decision -- once we lost the last engine, he nosed the airplane over.

And so when we hit the water, I went forward in my seat and down, so I am thinking we hit like this.  When we hit the water, we hit something like this (indicating).

CAPT THAXTON: That is at a what degree angle?

THE WITNESS:  Maybe a 30 degree attitude, because when I hit, my body went forward and I went down.  My headset came off, glass, water come shooting by me.

And my next conscious thought.  I was in the water.  I was trying to figure out what the hell I am doing there in the water.  So from the time in the water, I think -- I am almost positive -- I am probably 80 to 90 percent sure somebody else was alive after the accident because after I figured out where I was at, I was drawing on all my survival school skills, I tried to get everybody to come together or to find somebody else so we can get together.

There was flashing beacons out in the water.  I wanted to get over toward the beacons but I couldn't move because I felt my back was broken. I called out a number of times "Is anybody out there?," at the top of my lungs.  On two separate occasions, I heard, I'm over here." I heard that twice and I never heard it again, so I am assuming that somebody else was alive after the accident.

And then the restof the time, I was out there playing with the fish.

CAPT THAXTON:  Could you see anything else while you were in the water?

THE WITNESS:  While I was in the water, again, the only time I could see anything was when I would crest.  I would come up to the top of the wave and then I could see light out in the distance.  And I thought we were a lot closer to the shore than we were because I could see lights out in the distance flickering and I thought that was the shore.  And I was trying to paddle as best I could towards the shore.

And then probably within 30 minutes after the impact in the water, I was out in the water, I could hear a ship.  You know, it was probably 150 feet away from me.  And I was screaming at the top of my lungs and they had lights going in the water, so they were searching for something.  And I screamed and screamed a screamed; they never heard me. They went right by me.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Do you remember the weather at that time?

THE WITNESS:  Very, very windy.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Raining?

THE WITNESS:  No rain.  No rain. There might have been -- I don't think it was raining, but I was soaked from head to toe.  But it was very windy. The sea state was very rough because I remember I kept going up and coming down.  And I was sucking in the fuel and water, going up and going down.

CAPT THAXTON:  Other than the lights in the distance, did you see the aircraft at all.

THE WITNESS:  Aircraft parts were comlng -- I remember the one part because I know it was part of an engine that I saw was the tail section of the engine, that little cone.

COL LANDTROOP:  The little --

THE WITNESS:  That little -- with little fan blades around it.  I saw that go by me and it was smoking.  I thought, "Aha, this is interesting."  So I remember seeing that.  That came probably from me to you; was that close.

CAPT THAXTON:  So that's about --

COL LANDTROOP:  About three feet.

THE WITNESS:  About three feet or so.

I got to remember this is not video.

So, you know, off in the distance, I could see a flashing beacon.  And I am not sure what -- I am assuming when the wing ripped off -- again, this is my own troubleshooting -- that the wires from when you pull the ejection handle for the seats -- not the seats, but for the rafts, when the wing separated, it jerked the wire and that jettisoned the life raft.

COL LANDTROOP:  The life raft.

THE WITNESS:  I am assuming that.  That makes sense.

COL LANDTROOP: At any time during all that, did any of the fire handles -- lights on the fire handles come on, do you remember?  I mean, you would have seen a flashing light or a steady light.

THE WITNESS:  No.  I remember that.  That's only happened once in my flight career and that's a very definite sound.  That didn't go off.

COL LANDTROOP:  You made the mention there when the engines were shut down how quiet it was.  Prior to that, when you started having the problems, did you notice any vibrations or any unusual vibrations in the aircraft?  Did you feel the airplane yaw any?  Do you know how -- you have been on the airplane when you get NTS, negative torque on the props, did you feel any of that?

THE WITNESS:  No.  That's what surprised me.  It was just -- it was just so typical of the flight.  I mean just everything was running as advertised. COL LANDTROOP:  But when the engineer called out what was going on with the torque or the, you know, engine No. 3 --

THE WITNESS:  Right.

COL LANDTROOP: -- did you feel anything then?

THE WITNESS:  No.

COL LANDTROOP:  Nothing?

THE WITNESS:  No shuddering, nothing.

COL LANDTROOP:  Just --

THE WITNESS:  I was standing right behind the engineer, so I didn't feel anything.

COL LANDTROOP:  So as the engines were doing their thing, as they shut the one down and then as they were going through and having the problems, you never really felt anything --

THE WITNESS:  No.

COL LANDTROOP:  -- in particular?

THE WITNESS:  That's another strange thing.  It was just so smooth.  There was no sudden, abrupt motions of the aircraft.  It was very smooth.  The pilot just made a slow turn to the left, leveled out and nosed it over for descent for the water.

CAPT THAXTON:  And that was after the one engine, the No. 3 engine, was having problems or after all four were out?

THE WITNESS:  Once we lost the first engine, they made -- Bob Schott told Brant, "Let's turn this bird towards the shore" or "turn this aircraft toward the shore."  He made a slow left turn towards the coast.  And then at that time is when I went to my position and called the Coast Guard.  So from the time I made the call to the Coast Guard to the time I stood up, I guess maybe a minute or so, and then that's when everything dropped dead.

COL LANDTROOP:  Didn't have a lot of time to do an awful lot?

THE WITNESS:  That's the sad part is, I mean, usually when I listen to or read about an accident on an aircraft, it's, you know, 30 seconds tops to when an airplane impacts with the ground.  We had plenty of time, plenty of time.

And I wish the voice recorder had picked up this, because this confusion: "How come our check list is not working? This is what they train us to do and it's not working." And --

COL LANDTROOP:  Were there a couple of crew chiefs on the aircraft?

THE WITNESS:  Right.

COL LANDTROOP:  Did they get involved or not at all?

THE WITNESS:  Marvin was up in the bunk above the right scanner, you know, typical crew chief position, sound asleep.  And then the other crew chief, Ron, was behind the loadmasters, behind the toolbox.  And there was web seats is where he was at; that's where he was at.  Jimmy Johnson was in the back of the aircraft in the web seats back there.  Dave McAuley was in the load seat reading the paper.  And John Keyes just kind of -- I believe he was -- I believe he was giving a check ride.  He was kind of in the cockpit checking to see what was up, how Kirk was doing.

But the one thing is the night prior to this when we flew that I thought was kind of interesting, I had never seen this before, was we were a couple of hundred miles off the coast of Oregon and the front screen lit up with St. Elmo's fire.  I had never seen that before.

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.

THE WITNESS:  And I don't think that's applicable, but that was just something out of the ordinary that did happen.

COL LANDTROOP:  Did it -- I have had this happen before.  And occasionally when you have St. Elmo's fire like that, it'll build up and then it will discharge.  Did it do that?

THE WITNESS: No. It was just more along the wiper blades on the front.  It was kind of building up and flickering around and it went on for maybe 30 seconds to a minute and then it dissipated and then it went back.  And I thought that was kind of interesting.

COL LANDTROOP:  Do you remember how long that was before you started having the problem?

THE WITNESS:  This was the night prior to.

COL LANDTROOP:  So the night prior?

THE WITNESS:  Right.

COL LANDTROOP:  So that didn't happen that night? right.

THE WITNESS:  That was the night prior to,

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.  Do you remember them checking for circuit breakers, popped circuit breakers?

THE WITNESS:  That sounds familiar.  Again I just -- I was in my role as a radio operator.

COL LANDTROOP:  You were busy, I understand, but there was a lot going on.

THE WITNESS:  But that does sound like something -- that does sound --

What else?  But they didn't discharge any fire, I am pretty sure of that.

COL LANDTROOP:  Do you remember which engines -- you probably wouldn't, but you might -- what sequence the last engine to quit or shut down or whatever happened to it, do you remember which one that was?

THE WITNESS:  No, I -- I sure don't. I am sorry.

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.

THE WITNESS:  Torque indication on No. 3 sounds -- that just sounds crystal clear, like I can still hear it.

CAPT ENGLEMAN: Did they go of in sequence or -- you said all of a sudden it was quiet.  Did they go off all at once, all three of the engines, or the remaining three engines or --

THE WITNESS:  No.  We lost the one engine.  And then as I said, my situational awareness wasn't what it should have been.  I made the call to the Coast Guard.  And there was probably another minute before we started having problems with the other ones.  Because during that time frame, we had called Oakland Center, we had turned the aircraft towards the shore.

COL LANDTROOP:  I would say that your situational awareness was very good in the fact that you did go and call the Coast Guard because that's probably what saved your 1ife.

THE WITNESS:  That is what saved my life.

COL LANDTROOP:  So don't feel bad on yourself about the situational awareness.  There was a lot going on.  I know; I have been there.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Can I ask one other question?

So it was a minute between when the first one went off and then --

THE WITNESS:  At least.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  A minute gap or some small amount of time and then there was some more trouble. How long between then and no engines, between the start of the trouble?

THE WITNESS:  Probably another minute and a half to two minutes tops.  From the time we first noticed the problem to the time we lost the fourth engine was -- it couldn't have been more than three minutes, three minutes tops.  I would probably say closer to 2 1/2 minutes.  It was -- it was pretty quick.

LT COL KUH:  When you said things got quiet, things were quiet outside?

THE WITNESS:  No.  Things -- when it got quiet, I mean the engines shut down.  It was -- all I could hear was the wind.  It was kind of an eerie sound.

LT COL KUH:  So there was no engine sound, vibration or anything?

THE WITNESS:  Right, nothing, no sound at all.  The aircraft wasn't pitching; it wasn't yawing; it wasn't shuddering.  It was very smooth, very smooth.  And I was standing up, so I am pretty sure I would have noticed if there was a sharp or abrupt movement with the aircraft.

LT COL KUH:  At cruise altitude when you looked out, could you see the stars, clouds, ocean?  Do you remember what it looked like outside?

THE WITNESS: I know I couldn't see the ocean.  And as it was -- I looked out after we had -- before we got to Hemlo, I had looked out the window.  I don't remember if I saw the stars or not, because I didn't make a conscious effort to look.

LT COL KUH:  Sure.

THE WITNESS:  But --

COL LANDTROOP:  It was just dark?

THE WITNESS:  It was just dark and I just felt another Friday night.  I am a little tired, a long day.

COL LANDTROOP: Probably looked down at the ground.

THE WITNESS:  I couldn't see the water or anything, so I looked -- I was just settling in for another three hours.

COL LANDTROOP:  You just went back to your seat and put it back down?

THE WITNESS:  Right.

COL LANDTROOP:  Just like we normally do?

THE WITNESS:  Right.  I wasn't expecting it.  I wasn't -- I wasn't going to be tasked to do hardly anything on this mission except a little bit of

coordination just in case we got called by Big Foot and have the authentication devices to make sure the kit was loaded, the Mode 4 was loaded.  So that was pretty much my duties.

COL LANDTROOP:  You said that you flew the night before?

THE WITNESS:  Right.

COL LANDTROOP:  Do you remember about what time you got back from that flight the night before?

THE WITNESS:  I would say between 12:00 and 1:00 we got back, because I had missed my first class that morning because I was tired and I slept in.  So I think I went to my 11:00 class.  No.  When was the last class? I went to my 10:00 -- I skipped my 9:00 class and I went to my 10:00 class.

COL LANDTROOP:  Did everyone seem to be pretty well themselves that night, the crew, everybody?

THE WITNESS:  Yeah, everybody was a very good crew.  A lot of times you go with a crew, you got some people that don't want to do this and some people don't want to do this.  So this crew was more "Let's hang together.  What are we going to do?  What are we going to go see?  What are we going to do?  Everybody was on a friendly atmosphere.

LT COL KUH:  Looking outside again, when you couldn't see the ocean, what could you see?  Was it black or could you see any reflections or what?

THE WITNESS:  This was at twilight.

LT COL KUH:  So it wasn't totally dark?

THE WITNESS:  We took off at about 5:00 --  I guess it was 5:30.  Now, I can't remember.  It was about 5:30 we took off, so it was kind of sunset, twilight.  Sun sets in the west.  I thought -- I was just looking out, east, west.  But I was looking out the window and I was admiring the sunset for a while.  And then, again, it takes about -- what? -- about an hour to fly to Hemlo or so.  By that time, I had settled down in my position.  I had my dinner.  And I read a little bit of the paper and by this time it was completely dark outside.  So that was probably --

COL LANDTROOP:  Do you remember what the -- did you see the moon?

THE WITNESS:  No, I didn't.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  When the engines went out, was there any talk of feathering the props?

THE WITNESS:  On the first engine, they did.  That sounds familiar.  Feathering the engine and shut it off.  And I remember 'em -- I remember what they did to the first engine. They said, "Let's shut it down.  Let's feather it, shut it down."  And then he called an in-flight emergency at that time.

COL LANDTROOP:  But as far as you know, did they feather any of the others?

THE WITNESS:  I can't say for certain, but I would assume that's what they did.  Because wouldn't it have beat the airplane up if they didn't do that?  I am assuming.  I am assuming that's what they would do.

COL LANDTROOP:  I don't know.

LT STREFF:  The No. 3 engine is the one that first experienced trouble as far as torque indication, but No. 1 was the first one to go?

THE WITNESS:  No.  No. 3 is the first one that went down.  It had started all with No. 3, and then it went downhill from that.  No. 2 was the first.

LT STREFF:  No. 3 was the first one off line?

THE WITNESS:  Right.

COL LANDTROOP:  Anybody else have any questions?

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Yeah.  I am the flight doc and I have some questions about your injuries and stuff like that.

First, you said you went to bed at 1:00 the night before and woke up at about --

THE WITNESS:  Right, between 12:00 and 1:00. I got up about 8:00 or 9:00.  Well, hey, my first class was at 9:00.  I skipped that.  So I usually get up an hour before class, so I probably got up about 9:00, probably 9:15, if I was tired.  I have the snooze alarm.

And then I scampered off to class at 9:00 or10: 00.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  You said that the radio fractured your pelvis.

THE WITNESS:  I am assuming that's what happened, because the -- the cut on my leg, if you look at it, it's about -- the bottom of the PRC 90 is shapedlike this and that's what the wound on my leg reassembled, the bottom of a PRC 90.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  And is that -- do you know that that's where your fracture was?

THE WITNESS:  Yeah.  I have two on the left and one on the right.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Okay.  I saw that you were returned to flight status on the 2nd of March.

THE WITNESS:  That's right.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Did you have any real big setbacks during your recovery or did everything just kind of go along smoothly in your recovery?

THE WITNESS:  The only thing in the recovery is I gained 20 pounds sitting on my butt.  I started going to the gym. I started going back to the gym, you know, to lose weight.  I know my flight suit is really tight now, but I have been going back to the gym.

And it only seems to hurt a little bit in the late evenings.  If I have a long day, my ankle bothers me a little bit.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Uh-huh.

THE WITNESS:  But the healing process, as far as I know, went normal.  My doctor didn't mention anything out of the ordinary on that.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  And you are pretty much back to full function, other than some occasional pain in your right ankle?

THE WITNESS:  Right.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  And we're still waiting on some of the medical records.  I have read that you had some rib fractures.

THE WITNESS:  No.  I -- I had a hard time breathing.  The first night when they brought me into the hospital, I couldn't breathe.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Uh-huh.

THE WITNESS:  I couldn't find a comfortable position.  When they took me up on the helo and flew me back, I thought my back was broken because anytime anybody touched me, my spine -- my whole back was just in

an unbelievable amount of pain.  I mean, I was on fire anyways because all the kerosene was just eating at my skin.  But anytime anybody just touched me, my back would hurt, so I felt my back -- I assumed my back was broken.

CAPT ENGLEMAN:  Uh-huh.

THE WITNESS:  And I lost -- I thought -- what was the question?

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.  That's fine.

LT COL KUH:  Real quick.

Was the sextant in while you were cruising along?

THE WITNESS:  I would have to say no, no, it was not.

LT COL KUH:  You don't know if Kirk was planning on taking a shot?

THE WITNESS: No. Usually when the sextant's in, as you know from where you sit, you usually get in my space.  So I would know if Kirk was using the sextant usually because they bang the chair into my knees or whatever, so I am pretty sure that the sextant was not in at the time.

LT COL KUH:  Totally unintentional.

THE WITNESS:  I understand.

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.

LT STREFF:  I have one more question about the crew chiefs.  The crew chiefs didn't have any input at all as to what could possibly be wrong?

THE WITNESS:  If we had more time -- especially Marvin.  Marvin is an exceptional crew chief.  He would have been brought up.  But again, the time frame from the time we lost the first one until the time we lost the last one was less than three minutes.  And then it was "We got to keep this airplane in the air."  And that was up to the pilots and engineers to keep the airplane in the air, so that is why they weren't brought into the picture.

The loadmaster was trying to keep them alive in the back of the airplane, explaining how to use the safety equipment and that was what they were doing.  They were getting ready for impact.

COL LANDTROOP:  So in your estimation, there was some really good crew coordination that was going on?

THE WITNESS:  Yes, yes.  And actually, out of all of the engineers we have, I would probably say Bob Bob was the best.  Every year when you get a check ride every year and a half, they play a game called Stump the Dummy, trying to find out what he don't know or doesn't know.  Every time you ask Bob a question, he would answer it.  I never saw them stump him on a question.

COL LANDTROOP:  Okay.  Just I want to remind you not to discuss this investigation, your testimony as regards to, back, say, "Well, during the investigation, they asked this or they asked this or" --

THE WITNESS:  I understand.  So I am legally accountable for what I say in this room?  I cannot discuss what goes on in this room with anybody else?

COL LANDTROOP:  Right.

THE WITNESS:  I understand.

COL LANDTROOP:  And until the report is approved by the convening authority, and then this report will be released and at that time, it's okay.

THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Crystal clear.

(INTERVIEW CONCLUDED AT 6:10 P.M.)

CERTIFICATE

State of Oregon     )

     :   ss.

County of Multnomah)

I, Michael R. King, a Certified Shorthand Reporter for Oregon, hereby certify that the testimony of Tsgt ROBERT T. VOGEL was taken at the time and place set forth in the caption hereof; that at said time and place, I reported in stenotypy all testimony adduced and other oral proceedings had in the foregoing matter; that thereafter my notes were reduced to typewriting under my direction; and the foregoing transcript, pages 3 to 49, both inclusive, constitutes a full, true and correct record of such testimony adduced and oral proceedings had and of the whole thereof.

I further advise you that as a matter of firm policy, the Stenographic notes of the transcript will be destroyed two years from the date appearing on the Certificate unless notice is received otherwise from any party or counsel hereto on or before said date.

Witness my hand and stamp at Corbett, Oregon, this 8th day of March 1997.

Michael R. King, C.S.R/

Oregon C.S.R. No. 90-160